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UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE SUPREME
COURT'S FAILURE TO CURTAIL
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION FOR THE
DEATH PENALTY
United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Bass,' the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
ruled on the standard of proof required for a defendant to obtain discovery
to support a claim of selective prosecution for the death penalty. The Court
held that in order to attain such discovery, a defendant must demonstrate
that the prosecutors were motivated by a discriminatory intent and that the
prosecutors' conduct had a discriminatory effect upon the defendant.2 Such
a showing may be accomplished by submitting relevant evidence that
similarly situated persons were treated differently.3
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Bass was incorrect. The Court's decision imposes too high a burden upon a
defendant seeking to obtain discovery in support of a selective prosecution
defense where the Government is seeking the death penalty. In reaching its
conclusion, the Supreme Court relied exclusively upon United States v.
Armstrong, which set forth the general standard for obtaining discovery in a
selective prosecution case: defendants must submit some evidence that
similarly situated individuals could have been prosecuted but were not.4
However, the Court's absolute reliance on Armstrong was misplaced. The
pervasive policy consideration underlying the decision in Armstrong was
the Court's reluctance to intrude upon the constitutionally granted
discretion of the Executive to enforce criminal laws.5 However, the
importance of ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily
536 U.S. 862 (2002).
2 Id. at 864.
3id.
4 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996).
' Id. at 464.
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outweighs the need to maintain the Executive's independence in enforcing
criminal laws. The Court should have examined the applicability of its
policies in the death penalty context and imposed a lower burden on
defendants seeking discovery to support selective prosecution claims in
capital cases. The standard created in Bass will likely be highly criticized
for preventing meritorious claims of selective prosecution from coming to
light in the important cases where a defendant is subject to the death
penalty.
6
Moreover, this Note argues that the Court should have used Bass to
reconsider the standard imposed by Armstrong for non-capital selective
prosecution cases. While the severe nature of the death penalty requires a
more lenient standard, all selective prosecution cases are likely to fail under
the current "similarly situated individuals" test.7 The importance that laws
be executed fairly requires that the selective prosecution defense be
available in all cases, not only in cases where the death penalty is at stake.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE SELECTIVE PROSECUTION DEFENSE
The selective prosecution defense arises under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states in pertinent part that no
state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." 8 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has determined that under the
Equal Protection Clause, a decision whether to prosecute may not be based
upon "an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification." 9 Thus, to prove a selective prosecution defense, a defendant
must show that administration of a law is, "directed so exclusively against a
particular class of persons ... with a mind so unequal and oppressive" that
the system results in "a practical denial" of equal protection of the law.' 0
6 Many commentators contend that the Court's ruling in Armstrong effectively
disallowed the selective prosecution defense by making it nearly impossible for a defendant
to obtain discovery in order to sustain their defense. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams,
Symposium on Race and Criminal Law: Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 605 (1998); Marc Michael, United States v.
Armstrong: Selective Prosecution-A Futile Defense and its Arduous Standard of Discovery,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (1998); Melissa L. Jampol, Note, Supreme Court Review: Goodbye
to the Defense of Selective Prosecution, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 932 (1997).
7 See McAdams, supra note 6.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
10 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)).
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The first case in which the Supreme Court considered the selective
prosecution defense was Yick Wo v. Hopkins.'" In Yick Wo, the petitioners
alleged that a San Francisco ordinance limiting the use of wooden buildings
as laundry cleaners was enforced exclusively against Chinese individuals.'
2
The Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection
Clause because 200 Chinese subjects were prohibited from operating their
cleaners in such buildings, while eighty non-Chinese subjects were allowed
to continue operating their businesses. 13 The Court thereby established that
the Constitution prohibits the unequal application of a facially neutral law.14
The Supreme Court next considered the selective prosecution defense
in Ah Sin v. Whitman.15 The petitioner in Ah Sin alleged that a San
Francisco ordinance prohibiting gaming tables in rooms barricaded to
prevent police entrance was enforced exclusively against Chinese
individuals in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 16 The Court held
that the petitioner's claim was not substantiated because he did not provide
evidence that there were non-Chinese offenders against whom the law was
not enforced.' 7 Since Ah Sin, the Supreme Court has held that in order to
prevail on a selective prosecution claim, defendants must demonstrate "that
similarly situated individuals ... were not prosecuted.'
8
In Oyler v. Boyles, 19 the Court considered petitioners' allegations that a
West Virginia statute, imposing a duty upon prosecutors to seek mandatory
sentences for repeat offenders, was selectively enforced in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. To support their claim, petitioners introduced
statistics demonstrating that the maximum sentence was actually sought in a
minority of cases. 20 The Court denied their claim, holding that it was not a
constitutional violation to exercise some selectivity when enforcing the
laws.2' In order to succeed on a selective prosecution claim, defendants
must also demonstrate that such selectivity was intentionally based upon an
unconstitutional standard.22
" 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
12 Id. at 359.
13 Id. at 374.
14 Id. at 373-74.
15 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
6 Id. at 504.
'7 Id. at 507-08.
18 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (citing Ah Sin, 198 U.S. 500).
'9 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
20 Id. at 455-56.




In Wayte v. United States,23 petitioners were "vocal" opponents to the
Selective Service registration process.24 They alleged that they were
selectively prosecuted out of an estimated 674,000 non-registrants because
they had exercised their First Amendment right in vocalizing their
opposition to the registration program.25 In rejecting petitioners' claim, the
Court determined that selective prosecution defenses should be subjected to
the ordinary equal protection standards: a defendant must show that the
government engaged in discriminatory treatment that had a discriminatory
effect upon the defendant, and that the government was motivated by
discriminatory intent.26
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court considered the
selective prosecution defense was United States v. Armstrong.27  In
Armstrong, the defendants were indicted for selling crack cocaine and
alleged that the United States' decision to prosecute them was based upon
their race.28  The defendants sought discovery of certain documents
possessed by the Government, and in support of their request, introduced
statistical evidence demonstrating that African Americans were prosecuted
for crack sales in a disproportionate number of cases. 29 The Court rejected
the defendants' discovery request, emphasizing its reluctance to intrude
upon the discretion of the Executive in enforcing criminal laws. 30 The
Court held that the strong presumption in favor of honoring the United
States' prosecutors' decisions mandated a rigorous standard to prove a
selective prosecution claim, and that an equally rigorous standard was
required for discovery requests in aid of such claims because
"[d]iscovery... imposes many of the costs present when the Government
must respond to a prima facie case of selective prosecution.",3' The Court
thus established the current standard for procuring discovery documents in
a selective prosecution case: defendants must "produce some evidence that
similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but
were not.",
32
23 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
24 Id. at 604.
25 id.
26 Id. at 608-09 (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
27 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
21 Id. at 459.
29 id.
30 Id. at 464-65.
3 Id. at 468.
32 id. at 469.
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B. LIMITS ON DISCRETION IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
The Supreme Court has held that under the Constitution, the United
States Government is afforded broad discretion in enforcing the nation's
criminal laws.3 3 However, the Court has also noted that the death penalty is
unique due to its severe and final nature.34 Therefore, while the Court has
not significantly limited prosecutors' discretion in deciding against whom
they will seek the death penalty, it has imposed restraints upon sentencers'
ability to impose the death penalty. The Court has held that the discretion
of sentencers must be "limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action. 3 5 Although the Court has thus limited sentencers'
discretion in capital punishment cases, 36 it has never precisely determined
the scope of that discretion.37
In Furman v. Georgia,38 the defendants, convicted of rape and murder,
challenged the validity of the Georgia death penalty statute. The defendants
claimed that the imposition of the death penalty under the Georgia statute
constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 39 The Court ruled in favor of the defendants, and
vacated their death sentences. 40 However, the Court declined to hold that
the death penalty is a per se violation of the Constitution. 1 Instead, the
Court held that a state's death penalty statute is unconstitutional if the
sentencer is allotted too much discretion in deciding whether to impose
capital punishment4 2 Accordingly, the Court held that the death penalty
could not be imposed pursuant to a procedure that granted unfettered
discretion to the sentencer, thereby creating a great risk that the death
penalty would be imposed arbitrarily.
4 3
The Georgia death penalty statute was again challenged in Gregg v.
Georgia.4 The petitioner in Gregg contended that the amended Georgia
capital punishment statute did not effectively eliminate the dangers of
33 Id. at 464 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
34 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
286-91 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
35 Id. at 189 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 238).
36 id.
37 Leading Case, Death Penalty-Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances, 104
HARV. L. REV. 129, 139 (1990).
38 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3 Id. at 239.
40 Id at 240.
41 Id. at 310-11 (white, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
43 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
44 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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arbitrariness in capital sentencing procedures, as Furman mandated.45
Georgia's death penalty statute included a list of aggravating circumstances,
one of which the jury had to find in order to impose the death penalty.46
The petitioner alleged that the statute violated the Constitution because,
among other things, one of the aggravating circumstances was too broad to
actually limit discretion.47 The Court found that the Georgia statute did not
allow for the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.48 While the Court
acknowledged that the statute may have afforded the sentencer too much
discretion, it held that the state court could, and in this case did, limit that
discretion by interpreting the statute narrowly.49 Thus under Gregg, even if
a state capital sentencing statute allows for too much discretion on its face,
the statute may still be constitutional if that discretion is appropriately
limited by the state court's interpretation of the statute.
50
In Woodson v. North Carolina,51 the Court held that an offense may
not carry a mandatory capital punishment sentence. The Court concluded
that such a mandatory sentence violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, because it precluded consideration of factors such as the
defendant's character and life experiences in coming to a punishment
decision.52 The Court affirmed its Woodson decision in Roberts v.
Louisiana,53 holding that even where a state narrowly defines an offense for
which capital punishment must be given, a mandatory imposition of the
death penalty is unconstitutional.54
41 Id. at 199-203.
46 Id. at 196-97. In order to meet the constitutionality requirements imposed in Furman,
nearly all states now require that conviction and sentencing hearings be separated and that at
sentencing hearings, juries weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating
circumstances in reaching their conclusion of whether to impose the death penalty or not.
Daryl Kessler, Note, Eighth Amendment-Sentencer Discretion in Capital Sentencing
Schemes, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 829 n.l 1 (1994) (citing various state death
penalty statutes).
47 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201. In order to impose the death penalty, the jury had to find that
the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." Id. (quoting GA. CODE
ANN. §27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)).
41 Id. at 207.
49 Id. at 201.
5o Id.
" 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
52 Id. at 304.
" 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
54 Id. at 333.
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In Zant v. Stephens,55 a petitioner again alleged that an aggravating
circumstance listed in the Georgia capital sentencing statute was invalid.56
Although it rejected the petitioner's claim,57 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of aggravating circumstances. The Court held that an
aggravating circumstance must "genuinely narrow the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of
a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder.,
58
The Court considered the constitutionality of Georgia's capital
sentencing system once more in McClensky v. Kemp,59 this time in light of a
study submitted by the petitioner showing that the death penalty was
imposed in a racially discriminatory manner.60 The Court held that the fact
that similar defendants did not receive the death penalty did not constitute a
violation of the Constitution since there is no prohibition against leniency in
a particular case. 61  Because the petitioner was sentenced to death in
accordance with the Georgia statute, which required appropriate procedures
to screen out arbitrary selection, petitioner's sentence was constitutional.62
In Walton v. Arizona,63 the petitioners challenged the constitutionality
of the Arizona capital sentencing statute, arguing that an aggravating
circumstance listed therein was unconstitutionally vague. 64 As in Gregg,
the Court held that while the statute was impermissibly vague on its face,
the Arizona court had sufficiently narrowed the statute thereby bringing it
within constitutional limits. 65 The Court then clearly set forth the test that
federal courts must undergo in order to determine the constitutionality of a
state's capital sentencing statute.66 Courts must first determine whether the
statute is sufficiently narrow so as to provide real guidance to sentencers. 67
If the statute is too vague facially, federal courts must determine whether
state courts have sufficiently narrowed the terms in the statute so that the
" 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
51 Id. at 880.
" Id. at 890-91.
58 Id. at 877.
'9 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
60 Id. at 279.
61 Id. at 304.
62 Id. at 305.
63 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
64 Id. at 643.





statute provides "some guidance to the sentencer. ''68 The Walton holding
was reaffirmed in Arave v. Creech, 9 where the Court held that an
aggravating circumstance is not unconstitutionally vague if a state's capital
sentencing scheme limits sentencers' discretion so that their decision is not
completely arbitrary, 70 and if the aggravating circumstance genuinely
narrows the class eligible for the death penalty. 71
C. THE LIMITS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Prosecutors are given near limitless discretion in deciding whom to
charge, what to charge them with, and whether to seek the death penalty.
72
The judiciary rarely reviews prosecutors' decisions due to separation of
powers concerns, the desire to enhance the efficiency of the criminal justice
system, the potential chilling effect on law enforcement, and because the
prosecutors' decisions reflect their expertise.73 In addition, the Supreme
Court presumes that the prosecutors properly discharged their duties and
strong evidence is required to rebut that presumption. 74 However, the
discretion of prosecutors does not go entirely unchecked. Their decisions
may not be based upon "an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or
other arbitrary classification.,
75
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 9, 1998 a federal grand jury sitting in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan returned a second
superseding indictment charging Bass, and thirteen other individuals, with
multiple counts of intentional killing with firearms in the course of drug
trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 9210) (1996).76 Following the
68 id.
69 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
"' Id. at 470.
71 Id. at 474.
72 For a more in depth discussion of prosecutorial discretion generally, see Andrew
Loewenstein, Judicial Review and the Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 351 (2001). For a discussion of prosecutorial discretion in the death penalty arena, see
John Horowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a Committee to
Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2571 (1997).
73 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464-66.
74 See id. at 465 (quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1926)).
75 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
76 United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532, 534 (6th Cir. 2001); Brief for Respondent in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002)
(No. 01-1471).
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indictment, the United States filed its notice of intent to seek the death
penalty against only Bass. 77 Over the course of three years, the charges
against the thirteen others were either dropped, or the government entered
into plea bargains with the individuals. 78 In fact, the government began the
plea bargaining process with Bass, but due to complications, the plea
bargain was aborted.79 Subsequent to the failed plea bargain process, Bass
moved to dismiss the death penalty notice or, alternatively, to obtain
discovery of certain documents relating to the United States' capital
charging practices.80 In support of his discovery request, Bass submitted a
survey conducted by the Department of Justice that concluded that the
United States seeks the death penalty twice as often against African
Americans as it does against whites. 8' In addition, Bass submitted plea
bargaining statistics that showed that the United States enters into plea
bargains with whites nearly twice as often as with African Americans.
82
The District Court granted Bass's discovery request, and when the United
States refused to comply, dismissed the death penalty notice.83
The United States appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals under
18 U.S.C. § 3731.84 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's
discovery order 5 because it determined that the District Court had not
abused its discretion in holding that the statistical evidence introduced by
77 Respondent's Brief at 1, Bass (No. 01-1471).
78 Id.
79 The exact facts of the situation are rather complicated, but in sum, defendant Bass
provided confidential information to the government in the plea bargaining process. A
written copy of Bass's confidential statement was somehow obtained by a prisoner who had
been arrested due to the information Bass provided the government. That prisoner
confronted Bass and threatened his safety. As a result, the plea bargain was aborted and a
motion to dismiss the case was filed. Id. at 1-2, n.1.
80 Bass, 266 F.3d at 534.
81 Id. at 537.
82 id.
83 Id. at 535.
84 Id. In pertinent part, § 3731 states that "[iln a criminal case an appeal by the United
States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court
dismissing an indictment or information or granting a new trial after verdict or
judgment ... " 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2002). While this note does not address the issue, the
statute does not appear to authorize an appeal from a court's dismissal of a notice to seek the
death penalty. See Respondent's Brief at 4-10, Bass (No. 01-1471). The Supreme Court
failed to address the § 3731 issue in its per curiam decision. See United States v. Bass, 536
U.S. 862 (2002).
85 Bass, 266 F.3d at 534.
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Bass demonstrated both discriminatory effect and intent.86 The Sixth
Circuit then remanded the case for further proceedings.87
The United States petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.88 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of
whether Bass met the standard of proof required in order to obtain
discovery in a selective prosecution defense.
89
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINION
In a per curiam decision the Supreme Court concluded that in order to
obtain discovery pertaining to a selective prosecution defense where the
Government is seeking the death penalty, defendant must submit some
evidence that similarly situated individuals were treated differently.
90
The Court's decision consisted of only one page, and thus its treatment
of the case was limited. It first reiterated its decision in United States v.
Armstrong, that a defendant seeking to obtain discovery upon a claim of
selective prosecution must demonstrate some evidence of discriminatory
effect upon the defendant and discriminatory intent of the Government. 9'
Under Armstrong, in order to demonstrate a discriminatory effect,
defendant must make a "credible showing" that similarly situated
individuals could have been prosecuted, but were not.92  The Court
concluded that such a showing was not made by nationwide statistics
introduced by Bass demonstrating that "[tihe United States charges blacks
with a death-eligible offense more than twice as often as it charges whites
and that the United States enters into plea bargains more frequently with
whites than it does with blacks." 93 The Court determined that such
statistics said nothing about individuals who could have been prosecuted
but were not.94  Therefore, the Court found that the statistics, which
regarded overall prosecution decisions, did not adequately demonstrate that
similarly situated individuals were treated differently. 95 Moreover, because
86 Id. at 538-40.
7 Id. at 540.
88 United States Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862
(2002) (No. 01-1471).
89 Bass, 536 U.S. at 863.
9I Id. at 864.
9' Id. at 863.
92 Id. (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996)).
93 Id. (quoting United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d at 538-39 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY (1988-
2000), at 2 (2000))).
94 id.
9' Id. at 864.
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defendant was offered a plea bargain, the Court determined that statistics
regarding plea bargains were inapplicable to the case. 96  The Court
determined that because of his failure to meet the Armstrong similarly
situated individuals test, defendant was not entitled to discovery.97
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit's decision to allow discovery because it was inconsistent with




In accordance with the constitutional grant of power to the Executive,
the Supreme Court affords broad discretion to the Attorney General and the
United States Attorneys to "enforce the nation's criminal laws."99  A
selective prosecution claim challenges that discretion by asserting that the
prosecutor brought a charge for reasons prohibited by the Constitution,'00
and such a claim potentially causes the dismissal of a case.' 0 ' Because
abundant deference is given to the Executive in enforcing criminal laws, the
Court has been reluctant to allow selective prosecution claims and requires
that strong evidence be submitted to rebut the presumption that prosecutors
have properly discharged their duties.' 02
Although the Supreme Court has not traditionally placed many limits
on prosecutorial discretion in choosing whether to seek the death penalty
against a particular defendant, the Court has placed some limitation on
when capital punishment may be imposed because of its position that the
death penalty is uniquely severe and final. 0 3 Therefore, the Court requires
that a state's capital sentencing procedures adequately limit sentencers'
discretion to minimize the risk of arbitrary administration of the death
penalty. 0 4  The Court requires that a state "channel the sentencer's




99 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607
(1985)).
"' Id. at 463.
101 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 640-41, 653.
0.2 Id. at 464.
103 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
286-91 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
014 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.




sentencing scheme actually narrows the class of defendants eligible for the
death penalty.' 06
This Note argues that the standard adopted in Armstrong for obtaining
discovery to support a selective prosecution defense, that the defendant
demonstrate some evidence that similarly situated individuals could have
been prosecuted but were not, is ill-suited to capital cases because of the
severe and final nature of the death penalty. Part A of this note argues that
the discovery rule established in Armstrong and imposed in Bass makes it
virtually impossible for a defendant to obtain discovery and thereby attempt
to prove a selective prosecution claim.10 7 Part B argues that the importance
that the death penalty not be imposed arbitrarily outweighs the Supreme
Court's rationales for imposing such a high standard upon defendants in
order to obtain discovery in selective prosecution cases.1 8 Part C argues
that the Supreme Court should have adopted a more lenient standard for
obtaining discovery in selective prosecution cases where the government is
seeking the death penalty. 0 9 In Part D, this note further argues that the
Court should have taken an additional step by overruling the standard
imposed by Armstrong and creating a more lenient discovery standard for
all selective prosecution cases."l0
A. THE ARMSTRONG RULE EFFECTIVELY DISALLOWS DISCOVERY TN
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION CASES
In order to prove a selective prosecution claim on the merits, a
defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutorial policy had a
discriminatory effect and was motivated by a discriminatory intent."' To
demonstrate a discriminatory effect, a defendant must show that similarly
situated individuals could have been prosecuted but were not.'' 2  In
Armstrong, the Supreme Court extended virtually the same standard to
obtaining discovery in order to prove a selective prosecution claim by
requiring that defendants show some evidence that similarly situated
individuals could have been prosecuted but were not.' 13 The Court
explained that because many of the costs imposed upon the government in
106 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
107 See infra notes 111-36 and accompanying text.
108 See infra notes 137-66 and accompanying text.
109 See infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
110 See infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.
... Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
(1985)).
112 id.
.3 Id. at 470.
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responding to a selective prosecution defense on the merits are the same as
those imposed when discovery is ordered, the same standard should be
applied. 14  Thus, the Court determined that "[t]he justifications for a
rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution claim ...
require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a
claim."' 15
The standard imposed by the Court to obtain discovery will be
impossible for most defendants to meet. 16 In order to obtain discovery, a
defendant must demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were not
prosecuted. " 7 However, the information necessary to demonstrate that fact
will likely be in the hands of the prosecutor." 8 Therefore, most of the
information required by the defendant to justify discovery is exactly the
information the defendant is trying to discover." 9  In some cases the
defendant may get lucky and gain access to pertinent information prior to
discovery, 20 but most defendants will not be so fortunate. 12' This
effectively places defendants in a Catch-22-they cannot obtain discovery
until proving the merits of their defense, and yet they cannot prove the
merits of their defense until they obtain discovery.
The Court's position that statistics demonstrating a disparity in
prosecution are insufficient to substantiate a claim for discovery puts
defendants in an even more precarious situation.' 22  Because the Court
requires defendants to show that similarly situated individuals could have
been prosecuted but were not, 123 and because the evidence required to meet
124the standard will usually be unattainable without discovery, a defendant's
only hope in meeting the similarly situated individuals test will often be to
114 Id. at 468.
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 6, at 612.
117 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
118 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 624 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Tobin Romero, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfilling the Promise of
Equal Justice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043, 2049 (1996).
119 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 621-23.
120 See United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 1996) (where discovery was
allowed in selective prosecution case because the prosecution specifically stated that it
brought charges against defendant Al Jibori because he was a Middle Easterner traveling on
a false passport).
121 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 623.
122 See id. at 624-42 (arguing that the Court should allow discovery in cases where
statistics demonstrate a large disparity in the racial composition of those convicted of an
offense).
"' Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
124 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 624 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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rely upon statistics. 125 Unfortunately, the Court has consistently held that
statistics showing a disparity in prosecutions do not sufficiently
demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted, because
such statistics say nothing about individuals who could have been
prosecuted but were not. 126
In Armstrong, petitioners introduced data showing that African
Americans were charged with selling crack cocaine much more frequently
than whites. 127 The Court held that such statistics failed to demonstrate that
similarly situated individuals could have been prosecuted but were not
because the statistics said nothing about white offenders that had not been
prosecuted. 28 Petitioners then introduced evidence regarding an attorney's
conversation with a drug treatment center employee who stated that whites
and African Americans deal and use crack cocaine in roughly the same
numbers. 29 From this evidence, the Court could have deduced that because
the defendant had submitted some evidence showing that whites and
African Americans commit the same crime in roughly equal numbers, and
that African Americans are prosecuted much more frequently, similarly
situated white individuals were not prosecuted. 130 However, the Court held
that the attorney's testimony regarding his conversation with the drug
treatment center employee was hearsay and inadmissible, and considered
the issue no further.'
3 1
In Bass, the defendant introduced a study by the United States
Department of Justice demonstrating that African Americans are charged
with death-eligible offenses twice as often as whites.' 32 Notably, Deputy
Attorney General Holder and then-Attorney General Reno considered the
results of the survey troubling and found that the statistics warranted further
investigation into whether intentional discrimination motivated the
disparity. 133 Nonetheless, like in Armstrong, the Court found the statistics
125 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 612.
126 See, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 456; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
127 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459.
128 Id. at 470.
129 Id. at 460.
"0 See id. at 481 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the evidence provided by
petitioner was sufficient to support the District Court's discovery order).
"3 Id. at 470. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the report given by the drug
counselor should not have been excluded. He contended that such a report of personal
observations tended to support petitioner's claim of selective prosecution, and that at the
discovery stage, the drug counselor's experience should have been considered. Id. at 481
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 536 U.S. 862, 863 (2002).
133 United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2001).
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unpersuasive. 134  The Court held that "raw statistics regarding overall
charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated
defendants., 135
The Supreme Court's reluctance to allow statistics to play a role in a
defendant's attempt to obtain discovery to sustain a selective prosecution
defense virtually forecloses the only realistic ability of defendants to meet
the standard articulated in Armstrong.136  Without the assistance of
statistics, in order to obtain that discovery, defendants must effectively
prove their prima facie case. Thus, the standard of proof imposed in
Armstrong has all but eviscerated the availability of the selective
prosecution defense.
B. THE CONCERN THAT THE DEATH PENALTY NOT BE IMPOSED
ARBITRARILY OUTWEIGHS THE RATIONALES UNDERLYING THE
ARMSTRONG DISCOVERY STANDARD
The Supreme Court imposes such a high burden upon defendants to
obtain discovery in selective prosecution cases primarily due to its
reluctance to infringe upon the province of the Executive.137 Under Article
1I of the Constitution, the Executive bears the responsibility of taking care
that the laws are faithfully executed. 38 For that reason, prosecutors are
afforded broad discretion in enforcing the criminal laws of the United
States. 139 Therefore, "[i]n the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,
courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official
duties."'
140
The Court's reluctance to question prosecutorial discretion is justified
by administrative concerns as well. 14 ' Factors such as the strength of a
case, deterrence value, and a case's overall significance are deemed best
made by executive officers.142 The Court fears that its over-involvement in
such decisions will "chill law enforcement" by requiring the Executive to
answer to the Court. 14 3 Moreover, the high standard for obtaining discovery
may also be motivated by hesitance to allow the extreme consequence of a
11 Bass, 536 U.S. at 864.
135 id.
136 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 623.
137 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
138 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
139 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
140 Id. (citing United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
141 See id.




successful selective prosecution claim, which in most cases is a complete
dismissal. 144  Because the result of a successful claim of selective
prosecution is often to allow a potentially guilty person to avoid
punishment, the Court may impose a high burden simply to avoid that
outcome. 1
45
Although prosecutorial decisions are highly protected, they do not go
entirely unchecked. 46 Prosecutors' decisions are subject to constitutional
constraints: they may not base their decisions upon constitutionally
prohibited standards such as race or religion. 147 Hence, the Court will
review a prosecutor's decision for abuse of discretion where a potential
constitutional violation has occurred.
The Court's reluctance to interfere with the Executive obviously stems
from significant concerns.1 48 However, the policy that the death penalty
must not be administered in an arbitrary fashion is critical. 149 In Bass, the
Court failed to weigh these two policies against one another and thus
rendered a decision that ignored the latter.
While the Supreme Court has not significantly limited prosecutorial
discretion in seeking the death penalty, it has limited the discretion of
sentencers in imposing the death penalty based upon the rationale that
capital punishment is unique due to its severity and finality.1 50 The Court
thus requires states to take adequate measures to ensure that capital
punishment is not imposed arbitrarily.' 5' In Bass, two policies were thus in
conflict: the policy against unduly interfering with prosecutorial
discretion, 52 and the policy against allowing the death penalty to be
imposed arbitrarily. 53  The Court should have recognized that the two
policies were in conflict and attempted to balance them in order to reach a
decision.
First, the Court should have considered what weight it would give to
the policy of non-interference with prosecutorial discretion due to
separation of powers principles.' 54 The Court considers this policy very
144 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 640-41, 653.
145 Id. at 653.
146 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
147 id.
148 See id.
149 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 154, 189 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
286,91 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
ISo Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189; see also infra notes 33-71 and accompanying text.
151 Id.
152 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
113 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
154 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
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persuasive, and will only interfere with prosecutorial decisions when clear
evidence rebuts the presumption that prosecutors properly discharged their
duties.1 5 However, the Court should have considered the degree to which
it would have had to interfere with the prosecutors' discretion. If it had
lowered the standard by which a defendant can obtain discovery in a
selective prosecution case where the government is seeking the death
penalty, the Court would have preserved the threshold that defendants must
meet in order to prove their claim of selective prosecution on the merits.
56
In proving their case, defendants would still have to meet a high burden-
that the federal prosecutorial policy "[h]ad a discriminatory effect and that
it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."' 157 Therefore, the discretion
of the prosecutors would remain adequately protected by the formidable
additional hurdle that defendants would need to overcome-actually
proving their claim on the merits. 158
Next, the Court should have considered the basis of its policy of
limiting sentencers' discretion in order to curtail the risk that the death
penalty be imposed arbitrarily. 59  The Court limits the discretion of
sentencers in imposing the death penalty because of its position that capital
punishment is unique in its finality and severity. While the Court is more
lenient in its application of this policy than it is with its protection of
prosecutorial discretion, it nonetheless considers the avoidance of arbitrary
selection for the death penalty a compelling goal. 161 However, the Court
should have examined to what degree the discovery standard created in
Armstrong and upheld in Bass threatened the policy that the death penalty
not be imposed arbitrarily. Unlike the discretion of prosecutors, which
would be preserved by a defendant actually proving his selective
prosecution claim on the merits, 162 a defendant has no other means of
proving that the United States determined to seek the death penalty in their
case because of their race.1 63 The Court thus runs the impermissible risk of
55 id.
156 See id. (citing Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)) (stating the requirements
for a defendant to prove a selective prosecution claim on the merits).
... Id. at 465.
158 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 624 (arguing that the high standard for proving a
selective prosecution claim on the merits does not mandate a corollary high standard for
obtaining discovery in such a case).
159 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
160 id.
161 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
162 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 624.
163 See Jampol, supra note 6, at 933 (asserting that the selective prosecution defense is
the means by which a defendant can challenge a prosecutor's motives in bringing charges
2003] 1025
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
denying meritorious claims of selective prosecution where the government
is seeking the death penalty. While this risk may be permissible in other
contexts, the risk is unacceptable where the ultimate consequence is so dire.
If the Court's high standard was prompted by the desire to avoid the
harsh result of a selective prosecution claim-that the case be dismissed-
the Court should have examined this result in the death penalty context.
Unlike in other situations, where the result of a successful selective
prosecution claim is that the case is dismissed completely, a successful
claim of selective prosecution for capital punishment only results in the
dismissal of the government's notice to seek the death penalty.164 Thus, the
stakes are lower in the death penalty context because the defendant does not
escape punishment all together. The Court, therefore, should have
concluded that its policy of not imposing the death penalty arbitrarily
outweighed the policy of not interfering with the Executive, 165 especially
given the fact that the defendant will not escape punishment altogether if a
selective prosecution defense is successful on the merits.' 66
C. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ADOPTED JUSTICE
MARSHALL'S "NON-FRIVOLOUS" TEST SET FORTH IN HIS DISSENT
IN WA YTE V. UNITED STATES FOR CASES WHERE THE
GOVERNMENT IS SEEKING THE DEATH PENALTY
In light of the considerable importance that the death penalty not be
imposed arbitrarily, the Court should have constructed a more lenient
standard for defendants seeking discovery to support their selective
prosecution claims where the government is seeking the death, penalty.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Armstrong, stated that the "severity of the
penalty heightens both the danger of arbitrary enforcement and the need for
careful scrutiny of any colorable claim of discriminatory enforcement."' 167
A more appropriate discovery standard for death penalty cases is articulated
in Justice Marshall's dissent in Wayte v. United States.'68
In Wayte, Justice Marshall devised a three-prong "nonfrivolous"
standard for defendants to meet in order to obtain discovery in selective
against him).
164 See United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532, 534 (6th Cir. 2001). Defendant Bass sought
to either obtain discovery documents from the Government regarding its methods for seeking
the death penalty, or, in alternative, dismissal of the notice to seek the death penalty. Id.
65 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
166 See Bass, 266 F.3d at 534.
167 Id. at 483 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing McClensky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 366
(1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
168 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 626 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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prosecution cases. 16 9 Wayte did not concern a case where the government
had filed notice to seek the death penalty, but involved the selective
prosecution of violators of the United States draft laws.170 Thus, Justice
Marshall intended to apply his three-prong test to all selective prosecution
defenses.1 7 However, the Court has clearly rejected Justice Marshall's test
for general selective prosecution defenses. 72 Therefore, this section argues
only that even if, as the Court contends, the test is not appropriate for
general selective prosecution cases, it is necessary in the extraordinary
cases where the Government is seeking the death penalty.
Under Justice Marshall's "nonfrivolous" standard, a defendant would
be required to make a prima facie case by demonstrating that: 1) he is a
member of a class of persons protected by the Equal Protection Clause; 2) a
disproportionate number of persons from his class were selected for
prosecution; and 3) the selection was subject to abuse.1 73 Defendant is
required only to introduce enough evidence establish a "nonfrivolous"
claim that each of the three prongs are met. 174
In order to meet the second prong of the test, that a disproportionate
number of persons were selected from defendant's class for prosecution,
defendant must introduce some evidence showing that the government
identified for prosecution a disproportionate number of members of
defendant's class.175 Justice Marshall did not specifically state whether
statistics could be used to prove the second prong of the "nonfrivolous"
test. 176  However, the case from which he derived the test did allow
statistics to prove the second prong. 177 Thus, Justice Marshall's test would
likely allow statistics to make a "nonfrivolous" claim that a
disproportionate number of persons were selected from defendant's class
for prosecution. The third prong of the test is met if defendant can
demonstrate that selection for prosecution is subject to abuse because the
169 Id.
170 Id. at 601.
171 See id. at 626.
172 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469 (establishing the "similarly situated individuals" test
for obtaining discovery in a selective prosecution defense).
173 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 626 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 629 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contending that defendant met the three prong
test even though he did not introduce evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case of
the second element, but did introduce enough evidence to make a "nonfrivolous" claim).
'75 Id. at 627 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176 Id.
177 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (holding that the second prong of
the test was met in a selective jury selection case where the percentage of Mexican-




government can relatively easily disguise an unconstitutional selection as a
lawful prosecution.1
7 8
This test would lower the threshold that defendants must meet in order
to obtain discovery in the special cases where the government is seeking to
obtain the death penalty. However, this test would not lead to a flood of
baseless selective prosecution claims because the requirements for proving
the claim on the merits would remain high and it would only apply in cases
where the government has filed notice to seek the death penalty. 79
Moreover, this more lenient standard would foster public confidence in
the judiciary. Public confidence in the judicial system is adversely affected
by the appearance of bias in prosecution. 180 The Supreme Court has long
held that "[t]o perform its high function in the best way, 'justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice." 8' The more lenient standard proposed
by Justice Marshall would serve this ideal and would increase the
appearance of justice in the highly public arena of death penalty cases.
If Justice Marshall's "nonfrivolousness" test had been implemented in
United States v. Bass, Bass would have met the criteria. He is an African
American, and thus he is a member of a class protected by the Equal
Protection Clause. He submitted statistical evidence that the United States
seeks the death penalty twice as often against African Americans as against
whites. In addition, prosecutorial decisions whether or not to file a notice
of the death penalty are subject to abuse because the Government's
discretion is highly protected. 8 2 Thus, Bass would have been able to obtain
discovery and would have had the opportunity to attempt to prove his claim
on the merits.
78 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 628 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Selective
Service's draft enforcement policy was subject to abuse because it "[made] it relatively
easily to punish speech under the guise of enforcing the laws").
179 Romero, supra note 119, at 2070.
180 See Romero, supra note 119, at 2054-55 (arguing that statistical racial disparities
undermine public confidence in the judicial system). Many commentators have noted that
minorities have little confidence in the judicial system due to the perception that laws are not
enforced fairly. See, e.g., Talbot D'Alembert, After the Verdict. Racial Injustice and
American Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992 at 58-59; Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 699 (1995).
However, most polls demonstrate that approximately seventy percent of Americans support
the death penalty. See Samuel Gross, Still Unfair, Still Arbitrary-But Do We Care?, 26
OHio N.U. L. REV 517, 527 (2000).
181 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S.
11, 14 (1954)).
182 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
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D. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE OVERRULED THE STANDARD
IMPOSED BY ARMSTRONG AND ADOPTED A MORE LENIENT
DISCOVERY STANDARD FOR ALL SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
CASES
While the severe nature of capital punishment requires that a more
lenient discovery standard be imposed where a defendant is claiming
selective prosecution for the death penalty, a more lenient standard should
also be adopted for selective prosecution defenses generally. 183 This more
lenient standard would better adhere to the constitutional standard that the
laws be enforced fairly and would foster public confidence in the judicial
system.
The burden imposed upon defendants in order to obtain discovery to
sustain selective prosecution defenses effectively disallows discovery in
most cases. 184 This result reflects the Court's willingness to forgo some
meritorious claims of selective prosecution in exchange for protecting the
discretion of the government in making its prosecutorial decisions.1
85
However, the Court's decision is incorrect because it does not
adequately consider the negative results of its judgment. The Court has
long held the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws, to have a special bite when addressing racial discrimination. 86 The
Court has held that the concept of equal protection of the laws stems from
"our American ideal of fairness," and that discrimination based upon race,
or any unjustifiable standard, is "contrary to our traditions."'' 87 The Court's
decisions in Armstrong and Bass threaten this "American ideal of fairness,"
by removing the ability of a defendant to prove a selective prosecution
defense.188
In addition to jeopardizing the American ideal of fairness as embodied
in the Constitution, the Court's decision in Bass endangers the public's
perception of justice.'89 The appearance that laws are enforced unfairly
183 See supra Part V-C.
184 See supra Part V-A.
185 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 624 (arguing that the Armstrong decision will ensure
that many defendants with meritorious claims of selective prosecution are never able to
defend their case on the merits because they will be unable to procure discovery). See also
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464-65 (emphasizing the importance that the Executive retains broad
discretion to enforce the nation's criminal laws).
186 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
187 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
188 See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 6, at 624.
18' See Romero, supra note 119, at 2054-55 (arguing that statistical racial disparities
undermine public confidence in the judicial system).
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undermines public confidence in the judicial system. 190 The criminal law
system is dependent upon public participation and respect.' 91 Without these
elements, law enforcement officials would be in a considerably more
precarious position because officers of the law often rely on public
participation to aid in the enforcement of the laws. 192  In addition, low
public confidence in the criminal justice system reduces the deterrent effect
of prosecuting individuals.' 93 Thus, the Court's decision ultimately creates
a less effective criminal justice system.
Moreover, if the Court presents a real threat to dismiss cases where
individuals have been selectively prosecuted, prosecutors will be
encouraged to bring charges against offenders regardless of race. 94
Although the Court presumes that prosecutors' have faithfully discharged
their duties in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, 95 the Court
should not assume that prosecutors are immune from racism.196 Racism is
contrary to the constitutional standard set forth in the Equal Protection
Clause. 1
97
In addition, prosecutors are under a great deal of pressure to win cases,
and thus may selectively prosecute because charges against minorities are
more likely to succeed than charges against white individuals.'98
Regardless of the motivations behind decisions to prosecute selectively, if
the Court establishes a sincere threat against selective prosecution,
prosecutors will be forced to prosecute offenders regardless of race.' 99
Even if the Court adopted a more lenient standard for discovery in
non-capital selective prosecution cases, the discretion of the government
'90 See id.
91 See id.
192 Id. (arguing that the public is involved in the criminal justice system by providing law
enforcement officials with information about crimes, by acting as witnesses and by serving
as jurors (citing Brief Amicus Curiae of Former Law Enforcement Officials and Police
Organizations et al., in Support of Respondents at 8-9, United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d
1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-50031; 93-50057))).
193 McAdams, supra note 6, at 667 (stating that the deterrent effect of the criminal justice
system is dependent upon the "moral credibility of the criminal law").
194 id.
195 United States v. Chemical Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).
196 McAdams, supra note 6, at 667 (arguing that the Court's presumption that
prosecutors have appropriately carried out their duties rises to the level of presuming that
prosecutors are immune from racism).
197 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §2 (stating that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
198 See McAdams, supra note 6, at 651-52 (arguing that prosecutors may be as motivated
as any individual to perform their duties with an eye towards personal gain).
" Id. at 667.
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would still be protected by the high standard imposed upon defendants to
prove a selective prosecution claim on the merits.200  Therefore, by
establishing an easier burden for defendants to meet in order to obtain
discovery, the Court would not unduly compromise the Executive's
discretion in enforcing the nation's criminal laws and would aid the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system.
V1. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Bass reaffirms their
decision in Armstrong that created an unreasonably high standard for
defendants to meet in order to obtain discovery in support of a selective
prosecution defense.20 1 Additionally, the Court clearly established that the
same discovery standard that applies to selective prosecution cases in
general also applies to cases in which the government is seeking the death
penalty,20 2 an area of law in which racial bias is frequently alleged.
20 3
Although a unanimous, per curiam decision speaks with significant
authority, the Court's decision was ultimately incorrect. Moreover, it is
troubling that the Court would issue a per curiam decision in this case,
considering the number of commentators who contend that the decision in
Armstrong was incorrect.20 4
The decision in Bass is unlikely to actually effect the number of
successful selective prosecution claims, given that the last time a defendant
successfully proved a claim of race-based selective prosecution in the
205Supreme Court was more than 100 years ago. However, the decision in
Bass is likely to negatively affect the public's perception of justice because
the case occurred in the highly contested context of the death penalty.
Where the public suspects that the government seeks the death penalty
based upon individuals' races, the entire integrity of the scheme of criminal
law is jeopardized.
Jessie Larson
200 See Romero, supra note 119, at 2070.
20 Bass, 536 U.S. at 863.
202 Id.
203 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983);
Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of
Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 437 (1984).
204 See supra note 6.
205 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); see also discussion infra notes 8-14
and accompanying text; Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 466-68.
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